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15. Unraveling the law of war
Stephen Ellmann*
Ten years ago, in Hamdi, 1 Justice O' Connor wrote that the Court's
understanding of the law of war might "unravel." "Unraveling," it turns
out, is not precisely the right word. But the thesis of this chapter is that
the law of war has indeed - already - substantially evolved as it has
encountered the war, or conflict, with terrorism. In this clash of
ideologies and arms, the United States and other nations confront an
adversary different in many respects from the uniformed soldiers who
were the enemy in past wars. It is possible to argue that these differences
are so important that in fact we are simply not in war or armed conflict,
but I will reject that argument, and will argue instead that our understanding of what armed conflict is should adapt to the character of the use of
force today. At the same time, I will maintain that it is impossible to
ignore the differences between past and present conflicts, and that the
process of fighting justly in wars of this new character calls on courts to
play roles much broader than they may historically have played in the
United States (US). In short, I will argue that the constitutional war
power of the US now extends to conflicts substantially different from
many of the wars we have recognized in the past, and that the
constitutional authority of courts in these conflicts is and should also now
be substantially different.
This chapter is an attempt to work out the implications of one
fundamental intuition - that much of the reason that many observers have
resisted calling the struggle against terrorism a war is that they fear the
war paradigm will undercut the human rights of those caught up within
it. There is a great deal of justification for that fear, but the best way to
respond to it is not by denying that the ferocious acts of terrorists are part

* My thanks to the organizers and the other participants in the conference of
the International Association of Constitutional Law, Research Group on Constitutional Responses to Terrorism, on "Constitutionalism Across Borders in the
Struggle Against Terrorism" and as always to Teresa Delcorso-Ellmann.
1
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004) (plurality opinion of
O'Connor, J.).
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of an armed conflict. Rather, the best way to protect the rights that this
conflict may jeopardize is to address, head-on, the question of what
rights the law of this new kind of war must protect. In sketching this
argument, I will speak quickly about many topics that undoubtedly each
deserve more extensive treatment, but I hope that this short statement of
my argument will demonstrate the potential of the approach I am
advocating.

I. THE RESHAPING OF ARMED CONFLICT
There have been a great many conflicts involving arms, and by no means
all of them have involved uniformed combatants arrayed on the two
sides. Nevertheless the classic modern conception of war, the conception
that pervaded first the Hague Conventions and then the Geneva Conventions, was of a clash of armies like these. As others have observed, in
wars of this sort, when combatants are targeted or captured there are few
questions of whether or not they are in fact combatants. 2 Though not
every fighter is properly in uniform, most are, and no elaborate or
sophisticated factfinding apparatus is needed to read their insignia. Nor
do such combatants shrink from being identified as such after capture,
because ordinarily their uniforms are sufficient to demonstrate their
entitlement to prisoner of war (POW) status, and that status is noncriminal and nonpunitive (so long as the terms of the Third Geneva
Convention are observed). Moreover, although no one knows when a war
begins what the date of its completion will be, twentieth century wars
between states did in fact have endings, and (compared to the war against
terrorism) quite rapid ones.
Once the domain of armed conflicts expands to include terrorists, the
legal issues surrounding detention (and targeting) all become much more
fraught. Questions of jdentification abound, for terrorists rarely wear
uniforms, and the dividing line between civilians and fighters is far from
clear-cut. Terrorists also by no means welcome identification as fighters.
If they are so identified, they do not become entitled to the protections of
POWs, because their own fighting tactics - including deliberate attacks
2

The difference is not absolute: "even in state-versus-state warfare the
enemy soldier identification problem is not eliminated." Matthew C. Waxman,
Detention as Targeting: Standards of Certainty and Detention of Suspected
Terrorists, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1382 (2008). Waxman discusses both the

identification problem and the high stakes resulting from the prospect of
unending detention, an issue I take up in the text below.
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on civilians and the obvious lack of uniforms - disqualify them from
POW status. (Al Qaeda fighters do, to be sure, still benefit from the
protections of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949,
now that it has been established - in US Law, at any rate3 - that the
conflict between the US and Al Qaeda is at least a non-international
armed conflict.) In addition, they cannot count on release at any time
soon, or indeed ever. If the basic rule of combatant detention in
international armed conflicts, namely that combatants can be held until
the end of hostilities, applies to the kinds of hostilities in which terrorists
and the US engage, it is quite possible to argue that these hostilities will
continue longer than the lifetimes of all those in detention.
Moreover, it is quite clear that the events of terrorist attacks overlap
with the domain of criminal law in a way that traditional military
activities do not. We do not intuitively speak of the movements of army
divisions as crimes, but we have a long history of prosecuting politicallymotivated acts of terror under the criminal law. It can be argued that what
we confront is an insidious and widespread - indeed, transnational criminal conspiracy, rather than a military force.
One might respond to all this by saying that the conflicts between the
US and terrorists are not, in fact, armed conflicts - except, that is, when
these conflicts actually take the form of clashes of armies, as in
Afghanistan. If that is so, then international humanitarian law or the law
of war does not apply to them. Arguably those engaged in terrorism
could only be detained after criminal conviction, although the exact
dimensions of either US constitutional law on preventive detention of
terrorists or the international human rights law on the same subject are

3 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S . 557, 629-31 (2006). Common Article 3
confers protections on all those affected by "armed conflict not of an international character." These protections are far less elaborately specified than the
protections the Geneva Conventions secure for those talcing part, or caught up, in
international armed conflicts, but they are important nonetheless. Among the
most important protections are absolute bars, set out in art 3(1), on "violence to
life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and
torture"; "outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading
treatment"; and - the point at issue in Hamdan - "the passing of sentences and
the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a
regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples." Geneva Convention Relative
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75
U.N.T.S. 135.
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not entirely certain.4 Assuming, however, that detention would only be
possible on the basis of criminal law procedures, problems of identification would be resolved by application of the beyond a reasonable doubt
rule (not a perfect rule, as evidence of wrongful convictions attests, but as
good as we have got). Problems of unregulated and abusive treatment in
detention would be resolved by the Eighth Amendment, at least for
prisoners inside the US, and by the regimes of criminal punishment in
general. Problems of indefinite detention would be resolved as well, at
least as long as criminal sentences provided for a term of years. Even
sentences that were indefinite in duration would at least be imposed by a
duly constituted authority other than the detaining forces.
But this solution is not satisfactory, for two related reasons.
First, it misses the reality of the kinds of clashes we now must deal
with. Clearly, at least some conflicts with terrorism attain a level of
ferocity and intensity that qualifies them as armed conflicts. 5 The US war
with the Taliban, when the Taliban were the effective government of
Afghanistan, was such a conflict - a classic, interstate conflict. 6 When
the Taliban were toppled from power and became an insurgency against
the new government of Afghanistan, the war continued, now probably
best characterized as a non-international armed conflict.7 At the very
least, Al Qaeda, when it joined in the Taliban's war effort, became a
participant in these conflicts - though I will argue that Al Qaeda was in
fact party to an armed conflict in its own right as well. Moreover, in this
war it seems clear that some people who are members of no army are
nevertheless people carrying out a "continuous combat function," who

4

On the complex interplay of different bodies of international law bearing
on detention, see Marco Sassoli & Laura M. Olson, The Relationship Between
International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law Where It Matters:
Admissible Killing and Internment of Fighters in Non-International Armed
Conflicts, 90 INT'L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 599 (2008).
5
Claus KreB, Some Reflections on the International Legal Framework
Governing Transnational Armed Conflicts, 1.5 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY LAW 245
(2010).
6
See Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029,
1032 (2004). Ackerman maintains that "the struggle against Osama bin Laden
and Al Qaeda," in contrast, is not a war - but for the reasons laid out in this
chapter, I disagree.
7
See INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY ARMED CONFLICTS 10 (2011).
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deserve (as the ICRC study maintains 8 ) to be viewed not as civilians subject to military targeting only while engaged in combat - but as
fighters who are subject to targeting at all times. If only for this subset of
conflicts with terrorists, we must confront the problems of potentially
wrongful and indefinite detention that this kind of adversary presents.
But the point extends to events that involve far fewer attackers than the
extensive fighting in Afghanistan features . It is generally acknowledged
that Al Qaeda's terrorist strikes on 9/11 amounted to an "armed attack"
against the US, triggering a right of self-defense.9 But those strikes were
carried out by 19 men. Those men were hardly an army, but they were
fighters, engaged - I would say - in a continuous combat function, over
the months that were required for them to make their way to the airplanes
they would commandeer. If we do not say that, then we have to describe
these men as having been, over those months, civilians engaged only in
planning for a crime, while we simultaneously declare that the result of
their prolonged efforts suddenly transformed itself into a military event.
This abrupt transition from crime to warfare is too metaphysical; those
who are directly engaged in the many steps needed to execute a terrorist
armed attack are, I would say, engaged in hostilities throughout.
To the same effect, we can rightly say that we had a right of
self-defense against them at every point in their progress. This view
appears to be held by the Obama Administration. Kenneth Anderson and
Benjamin Wittes read Obama Administration statements as "most plausibly" arguing "that targeting is lawful against a threat that is continuing
on the part of some actor, and could result in an attack at any particular
8 NILS MELZER, INTERPRETIV E GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT
PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILJTIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARJAN L AW

(ICRC 2009).
9 Thus the UN Security Council on September 12, 2001, "Recognizing the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defence in accordance with the
Charter," called the September 11 attacks a "threat to international peace and
security" and "Expresse[d] its readiness to take all necessary steps to respond to
the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, and to combat all forms of terrorism,
in accordance with its responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations."
S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (2001). Similarly, the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization's Council, on September 12, 2001, "agreed that if it is
determined that this attack was directed from abroad against the United States, it
shall be regarded as an action covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty,
which states that an armed attack against one or more of the Allies in Europe or
North America shall be considered an attack against them all." Press Release,
Statement by the North Atlantic Council, NATO (Sept. 12, 2001), available at
http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01 -124e.htm.
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point in time - and therefore is continuously imminent with respect to
that actor; whether the actor is a group, network, individual, or; for that
matter; a state." 10 Harold Koh somewhat similarly declared in 2010 that:
in this ongoing armed conflict, the United States has the authority under
international law, and the responsibility to its citizens, to use force, including
lethal force, to defend itself, including by targeting persons such as high-level
al-Qaeda leaders who are planning attacks .... Of course, whether a particular
individual will be targeted in a particular location will depend upon considerations specific to each case, including those related to the imminence of the
threat, the sovereignty of the other states involved, and the willingness and
ability of those states to suppress the threat the target poses. 11

As horrendously successful as the 9/11 terrorist attacks were, moreover, they were not unique. It is a feature of our world today that acts of
terrorism can impose stunning loss of life. That matters: when people
commit slaughters, other people fight back; such events are the stuff of
war. As Gabriella Blum has written, "technology and globalization have
made individuals (or groups of individuals) capable of inflicting harm in
a magnitude previously reserved for large organized armed forces." 12
David Kennedy has observed:
violence has become a tactic for all sorts of players - warlords and drug lords
and freelance terrorists and insurgents and religious fanatics and national
liberation armies and more. States have lost the monopoly on metaphoric, as
well as actual warfare. War is now the continuation of a far more chaotic
politics, in a far more chaotic political environment. 13

10 Kenneth Anderson & Benjamin Wittes, The President's NDU Speech and
the Pivot from the First Term to the Second (Chapter 3), in KENNETH ANDERSON
AND BENJAMIN WITTES, SPEAKING THE LAW: THE OBAMA ADMlNISTRATION'S
ADDRESSES ON NATIONAL SECURITY LAW (2013), available at http://
papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2348532 (American University,
Washington College of Law Research Paper No. 2014-3) (emphasis in original).
11
Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State, The Obama
Administration and International Law, Speech to the American Society of
International Law (Mar. 25, 2010), available at http://www.state.gov/s/Ureleases/
remarks/139119.htm.
12
Gabriella Blum, The Fog of Victory, 24 EUR. J. INT'L L. 391, 420 (2013).
13
DAVID KENNEDY, OF WAR AND LAW 19 (2006). Kennedy views the
categorization of events under the law of war as ultimately a matter of
interpretation rather than firm rules, see, e.g. , id. at 120, 126; I would not go so
far, and instead argue that the line between these events should be drawn on the
basis of their actual nature.
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Terrorism, to be sure, is not new, and the US had anarchist bombings a
century ago. But just as the internet has made everyone a potential
publisher, so technology has made a lot of people soldiers. The men who
attacked Charlie Hebdo, dressed in black, heavily armed, and executing
those they regarded as their enemies, clearly conceived of themselves as
warriors, and the harm they did confirms their judgment.
In short, if we measure the proper scope of military authority by the
degree of peril presented, we should acknowledge that in today's world it
is possible for terrorists, even those not gathered on some field of
conventional battle, to be participants in armed conflict. This remains
true even if the terrorists are no longer truly gathered together under
some traditional hierarchy - as may well be the case today, with the
gradual diminution and fragmentation of Al Qaeda. 14 Networking is the
theme of our world, and networked violence with modern weaponry can
be armed attack. 15
Second, while it is true that terrorist "soldiers" are very likely also
criminals, it must be acknowledged that sometimes these criminals will
not be convictable. Exactly this problem plagues us today at Guantanamo, though for these detainees a significant part of our law enforcement
problem is that we abused and even tortured them during interrogation,
with the result that what may be ample evidence of their criminal guilt is
inadmissible and useless in courts that can claim any degree of constitutional or international legitimacy. But the problem is broader than that.
Sometimes terrorists cannot be captured, and so cannot be brought to
justice. Sometimes the evidence of their guilt may be lost because the
people who first come on the "crime scenes" will be soldiers in battle,
who will not be in a position to conduct extensive criminal forensic
examinations. Sometimes, as well, the evidence of guilt may come from
sources that are entirely undisclosable - not because they are unlawful
but because they are truly, and necessarily, secret.
14
On Al Qaeda, see Robert M. Chesney, Beyond the Battlefield, Beyond Al
Qaeda: The Destabilizing Legal Architecture of Counterterrorism, 112 MICH. L.
REV. 163, 185-98 (2013).
15
Current law requires at least two elements to show the existence of a
non-international armed conflict:
. (i) the parties involved must demonstrate a certain level of organization, and
(ii) the violence must reach a certain level of intensity.
INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, supra note 7, at 8. My argument
is, essentially, that the first of these criteria ought to be read with great flexibility,
given the stunning degree to which the second criterion - the intensity of
violence - can now be met by very modestly organized actors.
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It is quite true that many convictions of terrorism have been won in the
civilian federal courts, and I am not at all arguing against such prosecutions when they are feasible. 16 But where they are not, if the only
paradigm within which we can lawfully proceed is the criminal justice
system, we may have no way to proceed at all. That's true for any crime,
of course, and we accept it as part of a just Jaw enforcement system. The
harms that terrorists can inflict can burst the bounds of what we normally
encounter in criminal law, however, and it is hard to accept that they
might do so without lawful consequence. It is precisely to prevent harms
of such magnitude that the Geneva Conventions permit the parties to
international armed conflicts to detain each other's soldiers until the end
of the hostilities. Otherwise the soldiers will return to the battlefield.
None of this is an argument for the casual use of military force. Had
we realized who the 9/11 attackers were in advance, we surely would not
have bombed them as they moved about American cities, any more than
we bombed the German saboteurs who slipped into the US in World War
II and were arrested and tried in the case that became Ex parte Quirin. 17
But that would have been because no such steps were needed. The reason
would not have been that they were civilians, entitled to be acted against
only in a law enforcement paradigm. It might well be appropriate to
impose special restrictions, as a matter of policy or of law, on the use of
military force against targets who are not in a '"hot' conflict zone" - like
the 9/11 attackers in the pre-attack period. Jennifer Daskal has cogently
argued for such legal limits. 1s But Daskal's approach "assumes that the
conflict extends to wherever the enemy threat is found ," 19 and this
assumption makes sense. 20
16

See Laurie R. Blank, What's in a Word: War, Law and Counterterrorism, in
ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OP LAW AND TERRORISM (Genevieve Lennon & Clive
Walker eds. 2015); Federal Courts Continue to Take lead in Counterterrorism
Prosecutions [Fact Sheet], HUMAN RlGHTS FIRST (July 13, 2012), http://www.
humanrightsfirst.org/2012/07 /13/federal-courts-continue-to-take-lead-in-counter
terrorism-prosecutions-fact-sheet.
17
317 U.S. 1 (1942).
18
Jennifer C. Daskal, The Geography of the Battlefield: A Framework for
Detention and Targeting Outside the "Hot" Conflict Zone, 161 U. PA. L. REV.
1165 (2013).
19
Id. at 1172.
20
But see INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OP THE RED CROSS, supra note 7, at
22. The ICRC argues here that one reason to reject this view is "the consequence
that would be borne by civilians or civilian objects in the non-belligerent states."
Id. That is of course an important concern, but legal limits on the use of force
outside hot conflict zones in principle could address it. The ICRC also refers to
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II. THE EXPANSION OF RIGHTS
What then is to be done? The conflicts in which we are now embroiled
present grave risks to those we may wrongly target for killing, and to
those whom we do not kiU but instead capture and detain. I will focus
first, and most extensively, on how the law of war should regulate
detention; when we have traced the ways that a rights-minded law of war
can address detention, we will turn briefly to the issues involved in
targeting. 2 1
Let us start, however, with detention: if the conflicts we are now part
of will inevitably produce numbers of captives whose actual status as
fighters is somewhat open to doubt, and who face potentially lifelong
captivity now that we hold them, then we need a way to protect against
wreaking such harm wrongly. This is, in fact, what we have already
evolved.
(1) The availability ofhabeas for military detainees: Boumediene is, of
course, a decision that the writ of habeas corpus applies to military
detainees.22 I would not assume that POWs from some uniformed army
in a future war would enjoy the same right, though it is certainly possible
that they would. (As far as I am aware, no foreign soldiers held in POW
camps in the US during World War II petitioned for habeas corpus, and
"possible ius ad bellum issues that this scenario would raise," id., but it is no part
of my proposal to commit unlawful violations of non-belligerent states' sovereignty in the process of pursuing terrorists. More generally, the ICRC argues that
"with the exception of the few specific acts of terrorism that may take place in
armed conflict, it is submitted that the term 'act of terrorism' should be reserved
for acts of violence committed outside of armed conflict." Id. at 51. But the force
of this point of terminology seems diminished by the number of terrorist acts that
are in fact prohibited by international humanitarian law, given that (as the ICRC
itself shows, id. at 49) both treaty law and quite possibly customary law prohibit
"[a]cts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror
among the civilian population."
21 My argument for a "rights-minded law of war" does not rest on a
resolution of the questions of when and to what extent international human rights
principles apply in situations of armed conflict, but rather contends that the law
of war itself should become rights-minded. For a reading of international human
rights provisions as generally applicable during war, see Jordan J. Paust, Human
Rights on the Battlefield, 47 G EO. WASH. lNT'L L. REV. 509 (2015), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2563329; for an account
placing more emphasis on the "lex specialis" of the law of war, see INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, supra note 7, at 13-20.
22
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
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surely there is less need for such a protection for uniformed troops. But
as long as membership in a uniformed enemy army is a sufficient basis
for detention there also would be little cost to the availability of habeas
for POWs except in rote issuance of denials of the writ if they did have
the right to seek it.)23 But Boumediene makes clear that prisoners from
the non-uniformed forces that we have been fighting, who are now held
at Guantanamo, are entitled to the protections of the Suspension Clause.
Otherwise the risk of erroneous detention, and more broadly the risk of
arbitrary executive/military power, is too great. 24 Here, unmistakably, one
aspect of the law of war in the US - the separation of military detention
authority from judicial oversight - has already "unraveled."25

(2) The courts' role in determining where hostilities are taking place:
Boumediene and other cases also reflect that another feature of the law of
war has, almost unconsciously, come within judicial cognizance. This, as
Laurie Blank has shown, is the question of where hostilities are taking
place. 26 Part of the rationale for Boumediene is that our control over
Guantanamo is so complete and unchallenged that the perils of war
provide no basis for withholding the protection of habeas corpus there. 27
To say that is to say - as indeed the Supreme Court was prepared to say

23
The ICRC observes that "[i]t is generally uncontroversial that the detaining state is not obliged to provide review, judicial or other, of the lawfulness of
POW internment as long as active hostilities are ongoing, because enemy
combatant status denotes that a person is ipso facto a security threat." INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, supra note 7, at 17.
24
For the Boumediene Court's analysis of the inadequacy of the procedures
Congress had provided instead of habeas, see Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 779-92.
The Court specifically notes that "[t]he intended duration of the detention and the
reasons for it bear upon the precise scope of the inquiry." Id. at 783. The Court's
emphasis on habeas as a protection of liberty within the separation of powers is
evident at id. at 743, 765-66.
25 Deborah Pearlstein has emphasized the degree to which the Supreme
Court's military detention decisions (among others) do not defer to the executive
- another indication of the unraveling of the supposed separation of military
detention authority from judicial oversight. Deborah N. Pearlstein, After Deference: Formalizing the Judicial Power for Foreign Relations Law, 159 U. PA. L.
REV. 783, 800-807 (2011).
26 Laurie R. Blank, Defining the Battlefield in Contemporary Conflict and
. Counterterrorism: Understanding the Parameters of the 'Zone of Combat, 39 GA.
J. lNT' L & COMP. L. 1, 5 (2010).
27
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 754-55, 768- 71.
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in the context of the Civil War, in Ex parte Milligan 28 - that the war is in
one place, but not another.

(3) Extending Boumediene to make habeas available, where feasible, even
in areas ofhostilities: To my mind it is clear that an additional step
should be taken, namely for courts to assess whether the perils of war do
really prevent access to habeas corpus even when those perils are in fact
present. This of course was the question while we held detainees in
Afghanistan, and the D.C. Circuit has adamantly refused to accept the
existence of a constitutional right to habeas corpus for those detainees
because war is actually raging there. 29 There's no doubt that that
reasoning has a basis in Boumediene, but the conclusion that the ongoing
conflict against terrorism provides a reason to deny access to habeas in
Afghanistan seems ill-founded. The risks of mistaken identification in
Afghanistan were acute; the resentment fostered in the local population
by detention was intense; and the surprising reality was that the US was
clearly capable of elaborating a system of adjudication despite the
presence of war. In fact, we generated two distinct systems of adjudication - a system of military review boards of our own,30 and a system of
actual criminal trials carried out by Afghan authorities in facilities inside
the US-controlled Bagram base.31 If the reason for judicial involvement
at Guantanamo is to prevent avoidable injustice, that reason was present
in Afghanistan too, and so I would say that the fundamental point of
Boumediene calls for reduced judicial deference to assertions of the
necessities of war, not only at Guantanamo but also elsewhere.
(4) Judicial determination of when a war is over: Another issue also
seems to call for judicial intervention - the question of when the war
ends. 32 The Hamdi plurality says that the power to detain lasts as long as
28

4 Wall. 2 (1866).
Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Al Maqaleh v. Hagel,
738 F.3d 312 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
3
For a description of this system, see Jeff A. Bovarnick, Detainee Review
Boards in Afghanistan: From Strategic Liability to Legitimacy, ARMY LAWYER 9
(June 2010).
31
For a critical report on these trials, see HUMAN RlGHTS FIRST, DETAINED
AND DENIED IN AFGHANISTAN: How TO MAKE U.S. DETENTION COMPLY WITH
THE LAW 23-26 (May 2011).
32
Deborah Pearlstein has incisively discussed the potential role of courts in
addressing this issue. See Deborah N. Pearlstein, Law at the End of War (Oct. 1,
2013), Cardozo Legal Studies Research Paper No. 406, available at http://
papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2334326.
29
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the hostilities in question continue, but the hostilities that it points to are
not the ongoing clashes of the war against terrorism around the world but
the specific combat under way, then as now, in Afghanistan. But what
happens when the hostilities in Afghanistan end, as presumably they
someday will? The answer in current US law is in Ludecke, a case
decided well after the :fighting ended in World War II that nonetheless
declared that the President's wartime power to detain and expel enemy
aliens lasted until the political branches declared the war was over.33
Perhaps such a declaration will be issued just as the fighting in fact ends,
but if it is not, it seems to me that courts must speak to the question of
whether authority for detention still persists. This, again, is suggested by
Boumediene, in which the Supreme Court said that although it was up to
the Executive to say where US sovereignty formally extended, that
authority did not displace the Court's duty to say where the Constitution
ran.34
(5) Judicial review of the conditions of detention for military detainees:
A further question may now be coming within judicial purview as a
result of Boumediene: the question of the conditions under which
terrorism detainees are held. Here too one might maintain that the
soldiers of uniformed armies do not need the protections of the courts,
because they already have the protections of POW status under the
Geneva Conventions. But terrorist :fighters will not have that protection,
and if anything is apparent from the past decade it is that Common
Article 3 by itself will not assure detainees of protection against
mistreatment. But, as it happens, a divided panel of the D.C. Circuit has
recently ruled that Boumediene, by (according to the D.C. Circuit)
restoring the whole of statutory habeas protection to detainees, has also
restored the little-noted (and controversial) authority of habeas courts to
rule not only on issues of release but also on conditions of confinement. 35
That makes a lot of sense for detainees who are not otherwise well
33

Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948).
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 755 . I am happy to acknowledge that I learned
about this issue while working with a student, Melissa Jangl, whose post on the
implications of the possible end of fighting in Afghanistan can be found on
"Detained by U.S.", a website maintained for several years by the students in my
class on "Detention in the War Against Terrorism" at New York Law School.
.See Melissa Jangl, From Ludecke to Boumediene: A Path to Habeas for Bagram
Detainees ?, Detained by U.S., www.detainedbyus.org/from-ludecke-toboumediene-a-path-to-habeas-for-bagram-detainees/ (May 15, 2014).
35
Aamer v. Obama, 742 F.3d 1023 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
34
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protected by law. It also makes sense in dealing with detainees whose
rage against their captors is such that they are prepared to risk death by
suicide, and to trigger painful forced feeding meant to keep them alive the facts that provoked the DC Circuit litigation. When captor and captive
are so profoundly at odds, courts are needed to hold the balance between
them.
There is another reason why courts should have at least some role in
overseeing the treatment of detainees: that the Constitution requires it.
This of course is controversial. Two factors suggest, however, that we
should acknowledge (indeed, embrace) the Constitution's application, at
least in some respects besides the protection of the Suspension Clause, to
enemy fighters held in detention.36
First, Boumediene did not arise from nothing. An important part of its
basis was in the "Insular Cases" from the era of US colonialism, in which
the Supreme Court reasoned that while some rights guaranteed by the
Constitution did not extend beyond the borders of the states, others did. 37
Boumediene is an application of the proposition that the Constitution has
some measure of force beyond our borders, and there is no reason in
principle why that measure should end with the Suspension Clause especially since there is already some sign, in Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Verdugo-Urquidez, that the Fourth Amendment in a proper case
could reach beyond our borders. 38
36

Though the commands of the US Constitution are not directly part of the
international Jaw of war, they nonetheless help shape the law of war as
recognized in American law - since we cannot be party to law, whatever its
source, that is unconstitutional. The law of war itself, in turn, is a Jaw of nations,
including the US, and so in the end the requirements of our Constitution do
indirectly affect the contours of international law. (For an instance of the shaping
of US law in light of the "universal agreement and practice" of the international
law of war, see Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518 (plurality opinion of O'Connor, J.) ("The
capture and detention of lawful combatants and the capture, detention, and trial
of unlawful combatants, by 'universal agreement and practice,' are 'important
incident[s] of war."'). Here, in any event, the effect of reading the Constitution as
I propose is to buttress US adherence to principles of detainee treatment already
embodied in Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.
37 Boumediene describes these cases as holding "that the Constitution has
independent force in these territories, a force not contingent upon acts of
legislative grace," though limited by "inherent practical difficulties." 553 U.S. at
756-59.
38
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 275- 78 (1990) (concurring opinion of Kennedy, J.). For further reflection on Verdugo-Urquidez and the
Fourth Amendment abroad, see Jennifer Daskal, Transnational Seizures: The
Constitution Abroad, in this volume.
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Second, obviously the most acute concern in conditions of confinement
is torture. It is possible to maintain (at least one lower court has) that the
Constitution does not prohibit the US from torturing noncitizens
abroad. 39 I have trouble understanding how that proposition squares with
the underlying constitutional idea (emphasized by Justice Stevens in
Hamdan) of the "rule of law." 40 No case of the US Supreme Court has
actually held that the Constitution permits us to torture foreigners abroad ,
and we ought not to accept that as the law. If it is not the Law, if the
Constitution does prohibit at least some mistreatment of detainees abroad
(not to mention at home), then courts should enforce that safeguard.

(6) Judicial review ofthe continued need for military detention: Similar
logic suggests a further role for the courts. I assumed earlier that the
hostilities in Afghanistan would someday end. Everything comes to an
end eventually, but it is by no means clear that the hostilities between the
US and the terrorist network inspired by Al Qaeda will come to an end in
our - or the detainees ' - lifetimes. That means that detention under the
law-of-war principle that the end of the hostilities marks the end of
detention authority might be the equivalent of life imprisonment. It seems
to me that the law of war, framed as it was for a world in which wars
actually did end, should not lightly be understood to have this consequence. Perhaps one should say, as Jonathan Hafetz has thoughtfully
argued, that in a war without end, some ongoing measure of the need for
detention against its harm to the detainee should be undertaken. 41 Indeed,
our military tribunals do attempt to assess present threat, so that just
being eligible for detention as an enemy fighter is not, today, enough to
found a detention decision. One might ask whether courts can assess
39

Harbury v. Deutsch, 233 F.3d 596 (D.C. Cir. 2000), rev'd on other

grounds, Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403 (2002).
40

Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 635 (2006). I discuss this aspect of
Hamdan in Stephen Ellmann, The "Rule of Law " and the Military Commission,
51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 761 , 781-88 (2006--07).
41
Jonathan Hafetz, Detention Without End?: Reexamining the Indefinite
Confinement of Terrorism Suspects Through the Lens of Criminal Sentencing, 61
UCLA L. REv. 326 (2014). Applying a different approach to the problem of
prolonged detention, Matthew Waxman has argued that law-of-war principles
governing targeting can inform detention decisionmaking. He urges that "[a]s
time passes ... the balance between humanitarian costs and military necessities
that the law of war seeks to mediate tips toward the humanitarian interests," and
that therefore "[t]he legal framework governing detention of terrorist network
members should .. . gradually increas[e] the level of confidence necessary to
continue to hold someone." Waxman, supra note 2, at 1410.
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threat; I do not think there's much reason to believe that courts presented with the necessary information - will be any more fallible at
this task than soldiers in military tribunals. Meanwhile, the risk of
injustice in lifelong detention is so profound as to suggest the need for
judicial intervention. Indeed, the prospect of such indefinite detention
was part of what drove Boumediene.
(7) Judicial review of the executive's choice to exercise military detention
authority: Here is one further possibility, perhaps a more complicated
one than some of those I have discussed so far. As the early years of the
Bush Administration's use of military detention made clear, the sheer fact
that the government designated someone as an enemy combatant in and
of itself drastically altered the rights that that person retained. A person
held as an enemy combatant could validly be held that way on far less
proof than a person held as a criminal defendant - and the designation
was entirely up to the executive (a point brought home to me by a student
in class discussion years ago). That prospect remains, and indeed seems
inherent in a system in which many acts that (on my account) can be
parts of armed attacks triggering military force are also crimes, not just
war crimes but violations of the ordinary criminal code of the US. Should
there be some power for courts to review the designation - not the
adequacy of proof that someone fits the category into which he has been
assigned, but the decision to assign the category in the first place? I am
inclined to say that such a power should exist; one way to establish it
might be to require a showing that criminal prosecution is actually
infeasible, as Jennifer Daskal has urged. 42
Judicial review oftargeting: How much further should the law of
war - in its separation (in the US) of executive use of force away from
judicial oversight - unravel? Here we move from detention to targeting,
and with that move we add what might seem a critical additional reason
for judicial restraint: that courts should not interfere with the actual
conduct of combat. Justice O'Connor in Hamdi noted that "[t]he parties
agree that initial captures on the battlefield need not receive the process
we have discussed here; that process is due only when the determination
is made to continue to hold those who have been seized."43 But as Robert
Chesney has pointed out, some of the decisionmaking involved in
targeting "is slow-paced enough ... to allow for a quasi-judicial process
(8)

42
43

Daskal, supra note 18, at 1217-18.
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 534 (plurality opinion of O'Connor, J.).
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to unfold within the executive branch, with representatives of various
agencies and departments reviewing the intelligence and debating its
implications en route to multiple further stages of review" 44 - and if all
this can happen, one might think that there is a role for courts as well. 45
Is this inconceivable as a general matter? Actually we know it is not.
That is, we know that one nation, as embroiled in traditional and
nontraditional conflict as we are, recognizes a much greater role for
courts than we lately have. That state is Israel. Decisions of the Supreme
Court of Israel on issues such as targeted killing and indefinite detention
have received some attention. 46 But I am more struck by another case, in
which the court was asked to intervene in the midst of battle - regular,
traditional battle - in the Gaza strip. 47 The court heard the case. It
professed no jurisdiction over the issues of military necessity underlying
decisions to be made about how to fight the battle. But it insisted on its
authority to regulate the humanitarian law protection of civilians during
that battle. In fact , an officer of the Israeli army appeared in court to
receive and implement the court's directions. There is no sign that the
result was to deprive the Israeli military of its capacity to wage war.
It might be argued, in response, that to subject military decisionmaking
to law will have the perverse result of diminishing the moral self-restraint
that soldiers feel as they make the life-and-death decisions of their
profession. 48 I do not deny that this outcome is conceivable. But at the
same time I doubt that it is likely. The fear that law will rationalize rather
44
Robert Chesney, Written Statement, United States House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, Feb. 27, 2013, "Drones and the War on Terror:
When Can the United States Target Alleged American Terrorists Overseas?," at
6, available at http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/Research/Filesffestimony/
2013/ 02/27 %20drones %20chesneyI Robert%20Chesney%20Testimony_House%
20Committee%20on%20J udiciary_ %2002272013.pdf.
45
Chesney proposes a judicial role, focused on review of targeting of US
citizens, id. at 7; for a proposal calling for "an individualized threat requirement,
a Least-harmful-means test, and meaningful procedural safeguards for lethal
targeting and Law-of-war detention that take place outside zones of active
hostilities," to be implemented in part through ex ante "courts or court-like
review," see Daskal, supra note 18, at 1209-28.
46 Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel, HCJ
769/02 (2005) (targeted killing); A & B v. State of Israel, CrimA 6659/06,
1'157/07, 8228/07, 3261/08 (2008) (indefinite detention).
47
Physicians for Human Rights v. IDF Commander in Gaza, [2004) Israel
Law Reports 200 [2004).
48 See KENNEDY, supra note 13, at 167-69; Or Bassok, Missing in Action:
The Human Eye (this volume).
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than restrain is analogous to the fear that law, deployed in unjust states as
a tool to limit injustice, will wind up legitimizing the very injustice it
challenges. South Africa was such a state, in which anti-apartheid
activists and lawyers made extensive use of law. They worried about the
risk of legitimation, but history allows us to say, with confidence, that
anti-apartheid lawyering did not dampen the massive human struggle
against that evil system. 49 When soldiers and citizens question the
morality of acts of war, I do not think that court decisions holding those
acts lawful will easily alleviate their concerns. The conduct of war, like
the path of constitutionalism, is more than the decisions of courts. 50

CONCLUSION
In the world we have arrived in, war is more diverse than we had
expected and more present and frightening as well. We should not deny
this. Nor should we shrink from applying military force, and military
paradigms, if called for by the situation we face. But we should also
address the risk - rightly emphasized by those who have urged that we
adhere to a criminal rather than a war paradigm - that entering the world
of military force will tear apart the protections of human rights. 51 It is not
clear to me that adherence to a criminal paradigm will in fact preserve
any understanding of rights that the threat of terrorism really challenges;
as Chesney and Goldsmith have noted, different paradigms can and do
converge. 52 The proper solution, it seems to me, is not to try to deny that
49

I argued for the value of South African lawyers' challenges to state-ofemergency powers wielded by the apartheid government, despite such concerns
as legitimation, in a chapter on "Lawyers Against the Emergency," in STEPHEN
ELLMANN, IN A TIME OF TROUBLE: LAW AND LIBERTY IN SOUTH AFRICA'S STATE
OF EMERGENCY 248-74 {1992).
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° Cf Mark Tushnet, Legal and Political Constitutionalism, and the Response
to Terrorism, in David Jenkins, Amanda Jacobsen & Anders Henriksen eds., THE
LONG DECADE: How 9/11 CHANGED THE LAW 141, 153 (arguing, in the context
of the response to terrorism, that "political and judicial constitutionalism are not
sharply distinct from each other").
51
See Laurie R. Blank, The Consequences of a "War" Paradigm for Counterterrorism: What Impact on Basic Rights and Values?, 46 GA. L. REY. 719 (2012).
52
Robert Chesney and Jack Goldsmith, Terrorism and the Convergence of
Criminal and Military Detention Models, 60 STAN. L. REv. 1079 (2008). More
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we are now more often in the world of military force than we would like.
Rather, the solution is to reshape the military paradigm so that it does not
work the wholesale deprivation of rights that it might once have been
thought to. I have called this an unraveling of the separation of war from
judicial authority, but it might be better to say, borrowing from Macbeth,53 that what I am urging is to "knit[] up the raveU'd sleave" of war,
by bringing these two sources of power together.

HARV. NAT' L SEC. J. 305, 334 (2014). Monica Hakimi has recently urged a form
of convergence, arguing that a focus on choosing which "domain" - such as law
enforcement or armed conflict - applies is misleading, and that "all targeting and
detention law is and ought to be rooted in three core principles: liberty - security,
mitigation, and mistake." Monica Hakimi, A Functional Approach to Targeting
and Detention, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1365, 1419 (2012).
53 William Shakespeare, Macbeth, Act II, Scene ii, line 34.

